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The energy sector is the most important industrial sector of the Russian economy. In addition, 
oil and natural gas exports dominate Russian external trade and are the main source of Rus-
sian foreign exchange revenues. Thus, the development of the energy sector influences the 
overall development of the Russian economy. During the 1990s the energy sector had been 
confronted with production losses which, however, had been less pronounced than in other 
branches of the economy. Due to shrinking internal demand and export regulations, energy 
exports had not been affected by the negative production development during the 1990s. 
Since 2000, energy production has recovered. It has increased by 22 % during the period 
2000-2005; in the same period crude oil export volumes even rose by 75 % and gas exports 
increased by 7 %. As a result, Russian energy exports have regained their level of the pre-
transition period. Today, Russia is the worldwide largest exporter of natural gas and the sec-
ond largest oil exporter. 
In the following, we will first take a snapshot of the Russian economy (chapter 2). Then we 
turn to the facts and figures of Russian energy production (chapter 3). Here, the development 
of the Russian economy and production of crude oil, natural gas and coal is discussed. In 
addition, regional production patterns are briefly introduced. An overview on electricity gen-
eration follows in chapter 4. Then, energy exports are analysed (chapter 5). The prospects of 
the energy sector are discussed in a separate chapter (chapter 6) where the Russian energy 
strategy is presented and the international critique is summarized. In chapter 7 we highlight 
the climate policy of Russia. In the final section we will summarize the main findings. 
The agenda above covers only a part of the debate on the Russian energy sector. Beyond 
energy supply, there are quite interesting aspects of the Russian energy sector which we will 
not analyze in detail. These aspects, among others, are the question of ownership of energy 
industries, the concentration ratios and market entry barriers. In addition, we will not discuss 
in detail domestic energy consumption and energy prices. A third neglected aspect refers to 
governmental and political involvement as well as the overall institutional framework. As we 
can't go into detail we at least try to mention some of these aspects where it is necessary. 
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2  A snapshot of the Russian economy 
The development of the Russian energy sector to some extent depends on the overall eco-
nomic development and institutional framework of the Russian economy. Therefore, we first 
present some general remarks on the development of the Russian economy. 
During the 1990s the Russian economy had faced real GDP decreases and (severe) losses of 
industrial production. In particular, in the first half of the decade the Russian economy was 
confronted with the so- called transition crises. During the period 1991-1995 real GDP shrank 
by 9 % annually and industrial production by 12.8 %. In the second half of the decade, in 
particular, in 1997, evidence suggested economic recovery (GDP: 0.8 %, industrial produc-
tion: 1.9 %). However, one year later, the Russian economy suffered a setback of economic 
development due to the financial crisis in autumn 1998. Again, a decrease of real GDP 
(-4.6 %) and industrial production was observed. The situation changed in the following two 
years (1999/2000). Since then Russian economy has recovered. Real GDP has increased by 
7 %/a on average; industrial production changes amounted to 6.5 %, on average. 
Since the year 2000 the changes of real oil and gas production values are also positive. During 
the first five years (2000-2004) annual changes varied between 4.9 – 10.3 % (see table 2-1). 
The growth rate has sharply decelerated in 2005 (1.8 %). According to preliminary results 
only a slight increase can be observed in 2006 (2.6 %). Obviously, the oil and gas production 
nowadays are on a path of moderate growth. 
Table 2-1 
Real GDP, industrial production, oil and gas production, changes in %, 2000-2006 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1
GDP  10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 6.7 
Industrial production
2 8.7 2.9 3.1 8.9 8.3 4.0   
Fuel production  4.9  6.1 7.3  10.3 7.7 1.8   
1) Preliminary. - 
2) Based on gross production of raw materials, production and distribution of electricity and 
production of manufactured goods. 
Sources: Goskomstat, various issues, DIW (2007). 
 
Private consumption still plays the major role on the consumption side (see EBRD, 2007). It 
increases by 9.6 % on average during the period 2000-2005; it has also slightly increased in 
the second half of the 1990 (except in 1997). In contrast, cross fixed capital formation has 
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drastically decreased during the 1990s. According EBRD data which is available for the years 
beginning in 1995, cross fixed capital formation has decreased between 1995 and 1998 by 
12.3 %, on average. During 1999-2005 average annual increases amounted to 10.6 %. These 
investment increases are judged positive; however, it is also argued that higher investment 
outlays are needed to modernize the Russian economy. 
In addition to production outcomes, there are other positive economic developments: Inflation 
rates have steadily decreased (according to preliminary data 2006: 7.2 %, 2005:10.9 %) and 
the state budget is in surplus (2006: 6.5 % of GDP, 2005: 7.5 % of GDP). There is also evi-
dence for an improvement on the labour market where the employment rate has reduced to 
7.6 % in 2005 (2004:8.2 %). In sum, the Russian economy has overcome many problems of 
the 1990s which was the decade of the so-called transition crisis with its typical phenomena 
such as drastic production losses, soft- budget constraints and widespread non-payments.  
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3 Primary  energy  production 
3.1 Overall  development 
During the transition period the Russian energy sector faced heavy production losses. Accord-
ing to Russian official statistics in the period 1990-20001 overall primary energy production 
decreased by approximately 25 % (as measured in coal equivalent, see table 3-1).2 The reduc-
tion of energy production volumes was far below the reduction of other industrial sectors (e.g. 
during the last decade steel production shrank by one third, cement production even by 
60%).3 Thus, the energy sector has survived the so-called transition crises with less losses 
than other industrial branches. This, in particular, holds true for the Russian natural gas sector. 
Natural gas production only decreased by 9 %, whereas the decrease of crude oil production 
had amounted to 37 %. The coal production had also decreased by 37 %. A slight increase 
(4 %) could only be observed for the production of hydro and nuclear electricity; electricity 
generation will be separately analysed (see chapter 4). 
Since the year 2000 overall energy production is recovering. During the period 2000-2005 the 
increase has amounted to 22%. Again, the production recovery differs between the various 
energy carriers. Oil production has increased by 45 %; and coal by 18.5 %. The recovery of 
the natural gas production has started somewhat later - in 2001. Since then, gas production 
has increased by 10 %.  
                                                                          
1 It is difficult to define a starting point for the transformation of the Russian economy. We take the year 1990 
(among others, because of statistical purpose). This means that until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992 
Russia is defined as the RSFSR. 
2 The Russian statistics is based on conversion factors which diverges from international practice. The average 
coal equivalent factor for crude oil is 1,43, for natural gas 1,15 (which is quite high), for (hard and brown) coal 
0,65 and primary electricity 0,34.  
3 These two examples provide only a first impression on the harsh decreases of industrial production during the 
transformation period which affects almost all industrial branches including consumer industries. 
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Table 3-1 
Russian energy production, million tonnes of coal equivalent, 1990, 1995, 2000 –2005 
  1990  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
Oil , including condensate  738  439  463  498  543  603  657  672 
Natural  gas  739 687  674 671  687 716 730 739 
Coal  262 176  163 171  164 177 183 193 
Primary  electricity    98  95  102 108  105 106 111 112 
Others
* 20  11  6 7  6 5 6 6 
All  1857 1408  1408 1455  1505 1607 1687 1722 
* Wood, peat etc. 
Source: Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
Table 3-2 shows the development of production based on the commonly used physical terms. 
The figures also demonstrate the huge pre-transition production levels, in particular for natu-
ral gas and crude oil. In 2005 the natural gas production has exceeded its pre-transition level, 
whereas the crude oil production and the coal extraction still remain below their peak levels. 
In contrast to the oil sector, where several producers are engaged in field development and 
exploitation, natural gas production is concentrated in the hand of Gazprom (about 85 % of 
annual production).4
Table 3-2 















1990  137.3 257.4 516.2 640.5  166.8  118.3 
1995  101.0 161.0 306.3 595.0  176.4  99.5 
2000 86.2  172.0  323.4 583.6  165.0  131.0 
2001 83.0  187.0  348.1 581.2  175.0  137.0 
2002 74.2  182.0  379.3 595.0  164.0  142.0 
2003 79.4  197.0  421.7 620.0  158.0  150.0 
2004 70.4  211.0  459.2 633.0  178.0  145.0 
2005 75.3  223.0  470.3 641.0  175.0  149.0 
2006**     480.0  656.0     
* Including gas condensate. 
** preliminary data. 
Source: Goskomstat, various issues, Bofit 26.01.2007. 
 
                                                                          
4 Independent gas producers (e.g. oil companies, small gas companies) play an increasing but still minor role in 
the Russian gas sector. Their main problem is the access to the pipeline system which is controlled by Gazprom. 
Nevertheless, gas production of independent gas companies has increased recently and amounted to 94 Bill m
3 in 
2005 (IEA 2006) or 15 % of gas production. According to the Russian energy In the long run this share will in-
crease to 20 %. 
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According to preliminary data in 2006 oil production reached 480 Mill. t. Natural gas produc-
tion has even further increased to 656 Bill m
3. This is the highest natural gas production vol-
ume in the long history of the Russian gas industry! 
3.2 Regional  production  patterns  (crude oil, natural gas and coal) 
Regional production still follows the typical production patterns. Oil production is concen-
trated in the Ural okrug, in particular in the Tjumen area. Here, the Chanti-Mansijskij field 
has regained importance. The role of the North-Western region (including the Komi Republic 
and the Nentskii autonomnij okrug) is also increasing. Within the Privolschkij okrug the oil 
production of Orenburg fields has amounted to 17.5 Mill. t in 2005 (1990 10.3 Mill.t). In 
Siberia the most important fields are in the Tomsk area (2005 Mill.t). 
Table 3-3 
Oil production per region, Mill. t. 1990, 1995, 2000-2005 
  1990  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Russia  516 307 324 348 380 421 459 470 
North-Western region  16.9  10.3 13.4 14.4 15.4  18 21.6 24.5 
South-Federal region  11.9  7.8 10.6 11.5 12.3 12.7 13.3 13.4 
Privolschkij f. region  110  78.3  75.1 78.6 82.9 89.2 92.9 93.1 
Urals  365 202 213 231 254 283 310 320 
of  which  Chanti  Mansijnskii  306 169 181 194 210 233 256 268 
 Jamal-Nenetskij  59.3  32.3  32 36.3 43.4 49.1  53 50.7 
Sibiria  10.3 6.8  7 7.9 10.9 14.5 17.6 14.3 
Far  East  2 1.9 3.7 4.2 3.6 3.5 3.9 4.4 
Source: Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
Natural gas production is also concentrated in the Urals okrug. Within the Tjumen area the 
most important gas fields are located in the Jamal-Nenetskij okrug. These fields have pro-
duced the main part of gas production increases in the last few years. A small increase of 
natural gas production can also be observed in the Far East.  
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Table 3-4 
Natural gas production per region, Bill m
3, 1990, 1995, 2000-2005 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 
Russia 640.0  595.4  583.8  581.1 594.9 620.0 633.0  656.0 
North-Western okrug  8.3  3.7 4.0 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.0   
South-Federal okrug  8.4  8.5 14.4 15.4 16.0 16.6 16.7   
Privolschkij f. okrug  46.1  35.2 28.5 27.5 26.6 25.6 24.3   
Urals f. orkug  574.1  544.6  530.4 526.4 539.9 564.4 577.7   
of which   Chanti Mansijnskii  28.9 17.6 20.1 20.4 20.8 24.4 26.2   
   Jamal-Nenetskij  545.2  527.0 510.2 505.9 519.0 540.0 551.5   
Sibirskij f. okrug  0.2  0.1 3.0 4.1 4.8 5.8 6.1   
Dal'nejschebostot. f.o.  3.2  3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6   
Source: Regioni Rossiii 2003, part II, Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
The coal production is concentrated in Siberia. Within the region the highest production level 
is observed in the Kemerowo area (2005: 164 Mill. t; here: Kuznetsk basin hard coal) and 
Krasnojarsk (2005: 36.6 Mill t). The share of hard coal in coal production is increasing. In 
2005 the share of hard coal in coal production amounted to 75 % (1990: 65 %). In addition, an 
increasing share of coal is produced by open cast mining. Nowadays about two thirds of pro-
duction are extracted by surface mining (1990: 55 %). 
Table 3-5 
Coal production per region, Mill t 1990, 1995, 2000-2005 
  1990  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Russia  395.0 263.0 258.0 270.0 256.0 277.0 282.0 299.0 
North-Western region  29.8  22.7 18.8 19.1 13.1 13.8 14.8 13.1 
South-Federal region  29.8  19.5 9.7 9.5 8.4 6.9 6.4 7.7 
Privolschkij region  7.3  2.8  0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Urals   16.6  9.0  6.7  5.1 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.6 
Sibiria 250.0  171.0  194.0  207.0 199.0 220.0 224.0 240.0 
Far East  49.8  33.9  28.4  28.2 30.1 30.7 31.9 32.5 
Source: Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
3.3  A first brief conclusion 
Recent figures of Russian primary energy production are quite impressive, in particular with 
regard to the oil sector and the natural gas sector. Both sectors had faced problems during the 
transition period of the Russian economy. However, the energy sector was less affected than 
other sectors of the Russian economy. One reason might be that the oil and gas sector are still 
"strategic sectors" with special political interest and support. During the 1990s special regula-
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tion had been applied for the restructuring and – concerning the oil industry - the partly priva-
tization of the strategic sectors (see for example Ahrend and Tompson 2005). As a result the 
energy sector still is characterized by monopolistic or oligopolistic ownership structures. 
In recent years, a recovery of energy production can be observed. Production has regained 
their pre-transition level, on principle. Thereby, the typical patterns did not change signifi-
cantly. One example are regional production patterns which still follow past investment deci-
sions. In addition, the attraction of new investments and the development of new fields are 
obviously neglected. These are limiting factors for future production development. We will 
come back to the prospects of oil and gas production in chapter 6. 
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4 Electricity  generation 
The transition did not have a negative influence on the electricity sector with regard to overall 
generation capacities and electricity production, on principle. Plant capacity was maintained 
during the phase of shrinking industrial production and economic recession (see table 4-1). 
Electricity generation decreased by approximately 19 % during the 1990s (see table 4-2). 
Since the year 2000 the overall capacity of electricity generation has only slightly increased. 
Electricity production rose by 8.5 % during 2000-2005. In the same period the structure of 
electricity generation by power plants did not significantly change. The majority of electricity 
is generated by thermal power plants (66 %) (production by hydro: 18 % and nuclear power 
plants: 15 %)  
Table 4-1 
Capacity of power plants, Mill. kW, 1990, 1995, 2000-2005* 
  1990  1995  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
all 213.30  215.00  212.80  214.80 214.90 216.00 216.60 219.20 
            
thermal 149.70  149.70  146.80  147.40 147.30 148.00 148.30 149.50 
hydro   43.40  44.00  44.30  44.70 44.80 45.20 45.50 45.90 
nuclear 20.20  21.30  21.70  22.70 22.70 22.70 22.70 23.70 
* At the beginning of the year. 




Production of power plants, Bill kWh, 1990, 1995, 2000-2005 
  1990  1995  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
all  1082  860  878 891 891 916 932 953 
            
thermal  797  583  582 578 585 608 609 629 
hydro  167  177  165 176 164 158 178 175 
nuclear  118  100  131 137 142 150 145 149 
Source: Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
Russian gross consumption of electricity has followed the electricity production development, 
because external trade of electricity plays a minor role in Russian power sector. This can be 
shown by the following data: 
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Table 4-3 
Generation, net exports and gross consumption of electricity, Bill. kWh, 119, 200-2004. 
 1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
electricity production  860.0 877.8  891.3  891.3 916.3 931.9 
net electricity exports  23.9 15.7  11.1  12.9 7.1  12.3 
gross electricity consumption 836.1  862.1  880.2  878.4 909.2 919.6 
Source: Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
During the second half of the 1990s the decrease of electricity consumption was far less pro-
nounced than the estimated real GDP decrease of approximately 40 %. Thus, electricity inten-
sity of the economy increased during the transition period.5 Since the year 2000 the Russian 
economy is characterized by significant industrial production increases, in particular in energy 
and electricity intensive branches (e.g. during 2000-2005 cement production has increased by 
50 % and reaches 48,5 Mill t; steel production by 12 % to 66,3 Mill. t). Electricity consump-
tion did not follow this trend of industrial production. This implies a declining electricity 
intensity of the Russian economy. 
The regional pattern of power generation (table 4-4) show a quite balanced picture of power 
generation, in particular if regional numbers of population are considered.6 Regional differ-
ences still exist with regard to the type of power plant. 
Table 4-4 
Regional power generation, Bill kWh , 1990, 1995, 2000-2005 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Russia 1082.2  860.0 877.8 891.3 891.3 916.3 931.9 953.1 
Central region  246.6  189.7  195.8 196.3 196.7 207.1 200.4 209.8 
North-Western region  101.6  79.3 84.2 90.4 89.9 89.8 94.5 95.0 
South-Federal region  81.4  66.6 59.3 64.9 67.3 65.6 68.7 70.0 
Privolschkij region  220.2  172.7  175.8 177.7 177.0 181.8 187.5 187.5 
Urals   169.0  122.3  128.7  126.3 130.4 139.1 144.7 150.2 
Sibiria 215.9  191.2  195.2  196.7 191.3 194.0 195.9 199.9 
Far East  47.5  38.5  38.8  39.0 38.6 38.9 40.1 40.6 
Source: Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
                                                                          
5 The figures for real GDP changes during the 1990s can only be estimated. The EBRD (200) gives an estimation 
for the level of GDP in 1999 compared to 1989 of 57%.  
6 Electricity production in Russia amounts to 6,7 Bill. kWh/habitant, on average. The central region (5.6 Bill. 
kWh/habitant) is well in line with the average value, whereas the production/habitant is lower in the South Federal 
Region (3.1 Bill. kWh/habitant) and higher in the Urals (12.3 Bill. kWh/habitant). 
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5  External energy trade 
Russian external trade is dominated by energy exports, in particular by oil and natural gas 
exports. Exports of coal and electricity play a minor role. Therefore, in the following the 
analysis concentrates on mineral oil and natural gas. We first present the export figures; then 
we provide an overview on export revenues. 
5.1  Mineral oil and natural gas export volumes 
As can be seen from table 5-1 during the first half of the 1990s crude oil exports had de-
creased; since 1995 crude oil exports have recovered. The pre-transition level has been 
reached 2003. In contrast to crude oil, exports of oil products have been increased from 
54 Mill. t to about 97 Mill. t. during the period 1990-2005. One reason for this development is 
that Russia tries to increase exports of refined products. Natural gas exports have not regained 
their pre-transition level until 2005. First signs for a slight recovery of gas exports also date 
back to the year 2002. It has to be mentioned, that during the 1990s oil exports were limited 
by licenses or regulated by customs duties. The export of natural gas to western countries is 
dominated by Gazprom.  
Table 5-1 
Energy exports, 1990, 1995, 2000-2006 
  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
m i n e r a l   o i l            
crude oil, Mill. t  235.0  122.3  145.0 160.0 175.0 232.0 258.0 253.0  252* 
other  CIS   26.1 16.9 22.5 18.0 46.0 40.1 47.5   
third countries    96.2  128.1 137.5 157.0 186.0 217.9 205.5   
           
oil  products  54.0 47.5 62.7 71.0 75.0 77.0 82.4 97.1   
other  CIS  30.0 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.0 2.8 4.1 3.9   
third  countries  24.0 44.0 59.2 68.5 73.0 74.2 78.3 93.2   
           
natural gas, Bill. m
3 249.0 192.0 193.8 181.0 187.0 189.0 200.0 207.0  203* 
other  CIS  140.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 50.0 47.0 55.1 47.5   
third  countries  109.0 122.0 133.8 131.0 137.0 142.0 144.9 159.5   
           
brown  coal,  Mill.  T     0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1       
hard coal, Mill. T      1.6 2.1 3.2 3.5       
electricity, Bill. kWh      15.1 19.6 18.0 21.1 19.2 22.6   
* preliminary data. 
Sources: Goskomstat, various issues, Bofit 26. January 2007. 
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A typical phenomenon of the transition period is the change of the regional patterns of energy 
trade. Deliveries to CIS countries with low ability to pay their energy bill in hard currencies 
had been reduced during the 1990s in favour for increases of mineral oil and natural gas ex-
ports to "western" countries. With regard to natural gas exports and oil products this new 
pattern has been maintained to date. In contrast, crude oil exports to CIS countries have in-
creased since 2003. 
5.2 Export  revenues 
Since the year 2000 the role of mineral oil and natural gas in Russian foreign trade of goods 
has increased significantly (table 5-2). Whereas in 2000 these exports accounted for more 
than a half of foreign trade revenues, in 2006 the share of mineral oil and natural gas exports 
has amounted to almost 62 %. This is not only the result of increasing world energy prices; 
trade volumes have also increased. As a result, Russian foreign trade revenues are unilaterally 
structured with a high share of raw materials and a relatively low share of manufactured 
goods. Thus, Russian export revenues are dependent on world energy price developments, on 
principle. 
Table 5-2 
Exports of goods, mineral oil and natural gas , 2000-2006, Bill. US-$ 
  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
exports of goods, Bill. US-$  105.0 101.9 107.3 135.9 183.2 243.6 310.8 
of which:   mineral oil a.natural gas, Bill US- $  52.9 51.8 55.1 72.8 99.4  148.5  191.5 
  mineral oil and natural gas, %  50.4 50.8 51.4 53.6 54.3 61.0 61.6 
Source: Goskomstat, DIW 2007. 
 
The majority of energy trade revenues are earned by mineral oil deliveries (79 %), in particu-
lar by crude oil exports (see table 5-3). Natural gas exports have also doubled in the period 
2000-2005. However, the share of natural gas export revenues remains relative low (about 
21 %). 
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Table 5-3 
Exports of mineral oil and natural gas, Bill US-$ 
  1995  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
mineral oil  18.3  36.2  34 39.2 52.9 77.5  117.2 
of which:   crude oil  13.3  25.3 24.6 28.3 38.8 58.3 83.4 
 oil  products  5  10.9  9.4 10.9 14.1 19.2 33.8 
natural gas  12.1  16.7  17.8 15.9 19.9 21.9 31.3 
mineral oil and natural gas  30.4 52.9  51.8  55.1  72.8 99.4  148.5 
Sources: Goskomstat, various issues. 
 
In 2004 Russia has established a so-called stabilization fund. Oil revenues above an crude oil 
price of 20 $/barrel are allocated to this fund. By this, the volatility of world market prices on 
raw materials have a reduced influence on the domestic economy. In addition, the fund is 
created to absorb excessive liquidity. In rouble terms the amount of the stabilization fund has 
grown form 106 Bill. Rbl at the beginning of 2004 to 2346 Bill. Rbl. at the beginning of 2007. 
At the beginning of August 2007 the amount has increased to 3263 Bill. Rbl. (127.5 Bill. US-
$). From 1
st 2008 the Stabilization Fund will be split into a Reserve Fund and a National 
Prosperity Fund. The Reserve Fund will invest in low risk securities and will serve as security 
fund if energy prices will fall. Its amount will be about 10 % of GDP. Revenues above this 
limit will be allocated to the National Prosperity Fund.7 Thus, the new funds serves different 
task which are also discussed in the relevant literature under the label of "stabilization funds" 
and "saving funds". Whereas "stabilization funds" are created for short or middle term pur-
poses (e.g. to minimise effects on fiscal budgets), so called "savings funds" serve long-term 
objectives (e.g. intergenerational distribution). As we cannot discuss the issue of stabilization 
funds here in length we want to refer to some basic analysis and experience (Fasano 2000, 
David, Ossowski, Daniel and Barnett 2001).  
                                                                          
7 The funds do not only accumulate revenues of crude oil exports, but also revenues from natural gas and oil 
products exports. 
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6  Future projections: Russian scenarios and international 
critique 
The figures on the recent Russian oil and gas production increases and the resulting energy 
exports are impressive. From this background the prospects for further energy production 
seem to be quite promising. Indeed, the Russian energy strategy foresees large production 
increases in particular for the gas industry. However, there are also critical views on the future 
of the Russian energy sector. In the following, we first present some basic assumption of the 
Russian energy strategy with special focus on the gas and oil industry. Then, we summarize 
the main arguments and recent critiques of the debate among experts (see Gaddy 2004, 
Juurikkala and Ollus 2006, Riley 2006). 
6.1  The Russian Energy Strategy 
The Russian energy strategy dates back to August 2003. Since then, the energy strategy was 
not officially revised although the worldwide economic framework (e.g. world oil and gas 
prices) and the internal situation of the Russian economy have changed significantly. The 
energy strategy is based on an optimistic and a low scenario for the development of the en-
ergy sector until 2020. Thus, the combination of the scenarios provide a corridor for the de-
velopment of the Russian energy sector.  
The energy strategy is based on specific assumptions for economic and price developments. 
In the optimistic scenario real GDP will more than triple until 2020 compared to the year 
2000, investments into the energy sector will rose by 700 %. In addition, world crude oil 
prices will reach 30 US-$/barrel and prices for natural gas 138 US-$/1000 cbm. In the low 
variant GDP growth will increase by 220 %, investment will increase by 360 %. Oil prices 
will amount to 18.5 US-$/barrel and gas prices to 118 US-$/1000 cbm. 
Today, the economic development supports the assumption of the optimistic scenario. If the 
average GDP growth of 6.5 % (2000-2005) will also be sustained in subsequent years, then 
the assumed optimistic growth of real GDP will be achieved even before the year 2020. Also 
current world price developments support the optimistic scenario: With regard to crude oil 
prices, since 2004 the prices for Russian Urals exceeds even the assumption of the optimistic 
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scenario (see table 6-1). According to Gazprom figures the same holds true for the price for 
Russian natural gas exports (see table 6-2). 
Table 6-1 
Russian Urals prices, 1990, 1995, 2000-2007, US-$/barrel 
1990  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
20.25   16.40   24.71  21.40  20.85 30.31  27.42 33.06 53.70  56.09 
Source: Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/price.html. 
 
Table 6-2 
Gazprom average gas export price for sales to Europe, US-$/1000cbm 
2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 
129 126.5 128.5 132.9 140.5 
Source: RPI (2006). 
 
Although the overall economic and price development is impressive, the optimistic scenario 
will only be achieved if increases in investment can be realized. On average investment 
growth has amounted to 9.7 % during the period 2000-2005 (Goskomstat 2006). This increase 
is not in line with the optimistic scenario, it can only sustain the low scenario. In addition, 
there are no signs (and no real incentives) for a huge investment growth in near future. 
Notwithstanding the problems of the underlining assumptions on the overall economic devel-
opment, the Russian energy strategy contains a number of important assertions on the future 
development of the energy sector. In the following, the central settings are summarized with 
special focus on energy production and exports of mineral oil and natural gas.  
Table 6-3 
Production scenarios for 2010 and 2020, production level 2005 
 2010  2020  2005 
 low  optimistic  low  optimistic   
crude oil, Mill t  445  490  450  520  470.3 
natural gas, Bill. m
3 635 665  680 730  641 
coal, Mill t  310  330  375  430  298.3 
electricity, Bill. KWh  1015  1070  1215  1365  953 
Sources: Russian energy strategy (2003), Goskomstat 2006. 
 
The figures in table 6-3 show that the development of crude oil and natural gas production are 
well in line with the optimistic scenario. The targets for the year 2010 can be realized if – in 
simple calculation – current production levels will be maintained. The same does not hold 
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true for the production of coal and electricity. Here, even the targets of the low scenario are a 
challenge which will not easily be met. 
In the energy strategy the high production levels for crude oil and natural gas are combined 
with high export figures (see table 6-4). The export of oil and oil products is assumed to 
amount to 305-340 Mill. t in 2010 and 305-350 Mill t. in 2020. The high volume of the opti-
mistic scenario has already been achieved in 2005 and it is doubtful whether this high export 
level could be maintained over the next 15 years.  
Table 6-4 
Russian mineral oil and natural gas exports scenarios for 2010, 2020, level 2005 
 2010  2020  2005 
 low  optimistic  low  optimistic   
mineral oil, Mill t  305  340  305  350  350* 
natural gas, Bill. m
3 250 265  273 281  203 
Sources: Russian energy strategy (2003), Goskomstat 2006. 
 
The future of natural gas exports is also dependent on the level and the fuel mix of Russian 
domestic consumption. The question arise to which amount domestic gas demand can be 
substituted by other domestic fuels in order to allocate more natural gas for deliveries abroad. 
The energy strategy foresees a higher share of domestic coal consumption. In addition, it is 
assumed that energy intensity will significantly decrease. In sum, the optimistic scenario as-
sumes that domestic consumption will amount to 1270 Mill t coal equivalent in 2020 (low 
scenario: 1145 Mill. t coal equivalent) and about 760 Mill. t coal equivalent will be exported 
(low scenario: 665 Mill. t coal equivalent). 
Today, the Russian energy sector seems to produce impressive outcomes. In addition, the 
energy strategy draws a promising picture of the future. However, there are also critical 
views. 
6.2  International critique  
International experts doubt that the high production volumes can be maintained in the future. 
In the following we summarize the main arguments of the debate of the oil and natural gas 
sector development without going into the details of the various projections (for a detailed 
analysis see Gaddy 2004, Götz 2005, IEA 2006, Juurikkala and Ollus 2006, Riley 2006).  
We start with the oil industry. Here the main three points of discussion are:  
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First, the low reserve-production ratio in Russia compared to other countries. Although Russia 
is the second largest oil producer, it is only on rank "7"with regard to reserves, well behind 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq an others. At the same time, the extraction of huge existent oil fields 
is decreasing. In the future only smaller fields (in remote areas) will go into production.8 In 
contrast to this reasoning, other experts believe that there are still undiscovered and important 
oil reserves on the Russian territory. 
The second aspect is the non sufficient investment into the oil industry. The equipment of the 
oil industry is assumed to be outdated. Modern technology is needed in particular if extraction 
becomes more difficult in the future. In sum, there is need of replacement as well as moderni-
zation of production capacity. 
The third point refers to the investment climate and the overall institutional framework in 
Russia. The investment climate still suffers from state involvement into the energy sector and 
state regulation. The attitude towards foreign investors remains – at best – unclear. In addi-
tion, political involvement hampers long term investment decisions. During the last years the 
Yukos affair and the government attitude towards the oligarchs overshadow the impressive 
production development.  
The arguments of the debate on the future Russian gas production are quite similar to the oil 
production discussion (see for example Riley 2006, IEA 2006). Again, it is doubted that cur-
rent production levels can be stabilised or even increased in the long run.9 Compared to the 
oil industry, the peak of natural gas production is expected to occur later. However, super 
giant gas fields which will replace gas production from existent fields have not been devel-
oped, so far.10 The gas sector is confronted with a similar investment problem as the oil sec-
tor. The argument is repeated that huge investment outlays will be needed to modernize the 
outdated equipment and the infrastructure of the gas industry.11 The lack of investment and 
the unfavourable investment climate are the main arguments for those experts who have a 
                                                                          
8 A much debated issues are the Arctic oil and gas resources. In contrast to some optimistic views, Wood 
Mackenzie (2006) has provided a moderate estimation. 
9 In contrast to the oil industry, the situation of gas reserves looks quite promising: Russian gas reserves are 
estimated to amount to 47,8 Till.m3; the reserve/production ratio for natural gas in 2005 was 80 years (DIW 2006) 
10 The IEA (2006) estimates that Gazprom's production from existent fields will decline by 20 Bill m
3/year. Thus by 
2015 almost 200 Bill m
3 must be produced from new gas fields in order to stabilize production. 
11 Gas leakages, pipeline losses and inefficiency of compressor stations are some examples of the outdated gas 
infrastructure. According to the IEA (2006) Gazprom has increased its investment programme to 10.8 Bill. US-$ in 
2005. The IEA emphasis her concerns about Gazprom's priority on foreign acquisition and export infrastructure 
compared to the needs to upgrade investment outlays in the domestic gas infrastructure. 
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pessimistic view on the further development of gas production and the future Russian gas 
export potential.12  
In sum, there are quite distinct projections on the further development of the Russian energy 
sector. Whereas the Russian energy strategy presents quite positive scenarios, international 
experts are more sceptical. However, it is not an easy task to compare these different projec-
tions as they are based on quite different underlying assumptions with regard to the various 
parameters related to the energy sector as well as to overall economic development. 
                                                                          
12 According to Riley's (2006) overview a "gas deficit" of about 126 Bill m
3 will occur in 2010. One possible conse-
quence will be a reduction of energy exports to Western Europe, and in particular to Germany as the most impor-
tant western European customer of Russian gas deliveries. However, this scenario is based on various assump-
tions, among others, a stable gas production of Gazprom, a growing domestic natural gas consumption and 
increasing gas exports to CIS countries. 
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7  Russia and Climate Policy 
The first concrete action plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the so called Kyoto proto-
col, started in 2005 because of  the ratification of Russia in November 2004. With the Kyoto 
protocol, so called Annex I countries, i.e. Europe, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, Australia and Can-
ada, have committed themselves to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5,2 % compared to 
the level of 1990. Europe has declared according to their burden sharing agreement to reduce 
8 %, Japan and Canada 6 % and Russia, Australia and Ukraine have to maintain the emissions 
level of 1990. The USA did not ratify the Kyoto protocol. However, as more than 55 countri-
es13 which represent more than 55 % of the 1990 emissions have ratified the Kyoto protocol, 
the agreement became legally binding with Russias ratification. Russia played a crucial role in 
this process, as without Russia the 55 % share would have not reached. In November 2004, 
Russia ratified the Kyoto protocol.  
Within the Kyoto protocol, emissions trading allow that emissions permits can be traded be-
tween the Annex I countries. The so called joint implementation (JI) projects, i.e. investment 
projects that aim to reduce emissions within Annex I countries allow for example that con-
crete projects between Russia and Europe. If for example a German energy companies invests 
in concrete projects that reduces emissions in Russia, the emissions credits that are reached 
due to the project can be attributed to Germany. Russia in this case would gain from direct 
investment and project transfers. The same procedure is allowed between Annex I and non 
Annex I countries as so called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
                                                                          
13 More than 55 countries have ratified the Kyoto protocol, but only so called Annex I countries have binding 
emissions reduction targets, the other countries, as for example China, has ratified the Kyoto protocol, but does 
not have concrete emissions reduction targets. 
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Figure 7-1 

































Source: Russian Government (2007, p. 9) 
 
Because of the economic decline of the Russian economy after 1990, emissions diminished 
heavily, in 2004, Russian greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions still were some 33 % below the 
Kyoto commitment. emissions  of CO2 accounted for the largest share (80 %) of total emis-
sions in 1999. A large share of the decrease on CO2 emissions since 1990 comes from the 
reduction in energy consumption but can also be attributed to the increase in the share of 
natural gas and a shift from nuclear power to hydro power. As emissions reduced drastically 
after 1990 (figure 7-1), Russia potentially can sell emissions permits and therefore gain large 
revenues (Kemfert 2002 and Haites et al 2004). As it seems that within the Kyoto commit-
ment time period of 2008-2012 Russian emissions will most likely below the 1990 level, 
selling emissions permits could gain a revenue of up to 10 Mio per year.14 Annex I parties 
with an emission reduction obligation in the first commitment period is eligible to transfer so 
called emission reduction units (ERU) if the compliance criteria are fulfilled.15 However, it is 
unlikely that Russia will create a domestic emissions trading system within the first commit-
                                                                          
14 If emissions permits price of 20 Euro per ton of CO2 equiv. would be reached on average. 
15 See Korpoo and Moe (2007) 
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ment period. Russia is also very attractive to create joint JI projects. Currently, there are 23 JI 
projects that have been contracted and submitted to the approval procedures. Russia estab-
lished national guidelines for JI procedures, it remains still unsolved though which ministry 
will secure project approval.16 Because of this, it might be unattractive for Russian firms to 
lobby directly with different Ministries and facing such kind of uncertainties regarding the 
transfer of ERUs by the Russian government. The legislative basis for the JI projects will 
most likely be linked to the Federal Law on Capital Investments.  
The Russian climate policy was never very high on the political agenda. As many scientists 
even do not see that there might by any man made human threat to the climate and if, it could 
be beneficial for Russia, the ratification discussion before 2004 seems to be most likely pri-
marily driven by the Russian aim to get accession to the WTO. Therefore, Russia identifies 
the domestic climate policy more or less as energy policy. In fact, Russia is one of the most 
energy-intensive and CO2-emitting economies in the world. According to Russia's energy 
strategy for 2020 the current energy consumption can be reduced by nearly 50% if energy 
resources are used more efficiently. Although a certain amount of progress has been made in 
recent years, there is still a vast potential to enhance energy efficiency.  
If Russia however grows as fast as in the past few years, Russia could turn from a seller of 
emissions permits to a buyer. Russia also expressed that any kind of climate policy in Russia 
could limit the economic growth. If Western nations want to substitute fossil fuels, Russia as 
the main seller of fossil fuels in the world might not benefit from such kind of development. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia would build any kind of strong position in any future 
climate pact. Public awareness of the impacts of climate change, also in Russia may change 
this position. However, it is much more likely that the USA will agree soon to a future climate 
pact than Russia. It could be that Russia will take over the USA´s position to block any fur-
ther effort towards an international climate policy. 
                                                                          
16 The Ministry of Industry and Energy and the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Economic De-
velopment and Trade (MEDT) still negotiate about their within the project approval procedures. 
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8  The past and the future: summary and prospects 
Current Russian energy production volumes are quite impressive. A decade ago, when the 
transition crisis had led to massive industrial production losses which had also affected the 
energy industry, this recovery had not been anticipated. At that time, projections (at best) 
have assumed a stabilization of further production volumes; production decreases had not 
been excluded. The IEA (1995) in the survey of the Russian Federation pointed to severe 
shortage of investment in the fuel and energy sector and the deterioration of the resource base. 
In addition, the IEA mentioned problems with energy infrastructure and regional supply as 
well as typical difficulties of the transition period (e.g. soft budget constraints and non-
payment as well as financial problems of companies, price regulations and cross subsidies). 
Two years before, in 1993, an energy strategy had been adopted with quite ambitious goals 
but opaque means. The IEA (1995) summarized: "The directions outlined in the Strategy are 
broadly correct. However, the role of the market in achieving them is not always made ex-
plicit." According to the old energy strategy Russian crude oil production (incl. condensate) 
should amount to 270-310 Mio. t in year 2000. In fact, this goal was achieved (323 Mill. t). In 
contrast, the estimated natural gas production (incl. oil gas) of 660-740 Bill m
3 could not be 
realized (compared to 583 Bill. m
3).  
The current situation in some aspects resembles the past diagnosis. Again, the main point of 
critique is the lack of investment in the energy sector which constrains, among others, the 
development of new fields and infrastructure construction. It is argued, that the ambitious 
(production) goals of the (new) energy strategy cannot be achieved without substantial in-
vestment increases. A second point refers to the (oligopolistic or monopolistic) structure of 
the oil sector respectively gas sector. With regard to market mechanisms and concentration in 
the energy sector the lack of an adequate competition policy and prudent regulation are causes 
for concern. Today, the typical problems of transition (e.g. non-payment) are not visible any 
more; however, there are still non transparent regulations in place. A third point is the inade-
quate (economic) framework, e.g. institutional deficiencies and political involvement into the 
energy sector, with negative impacts on the investment climate. All of these points are valid 
counter-arguments why the ambitious goals of the Russian energy strategy will not be 
achieved in the long run. However, the experience of the past also shows that regardless of 
economic reasoning Russian energy policy and the strong state will stick to its strategic plans.  
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The recent developments of energy production and exports bear also their risks. One of them 
is the increasing role of the energy sector in Russian foreign trade. Volumes of energy exports 
(in particular mineral oil) have increased in recent years. In addition energy prices have in-
creased on the world market. The combined effect is that the share of Russian oil and gas 
export revenues has increased from 50.4 % (2000) to 61.6 % (2006). As a result, Russian 
foreign trade has become more dependent on energy exports and the energy price develop-
ments on international markets. Russia has faced this problem and has established the Stabili-
zation Fund (from 2008 labelled Reserve Fund) as a security fund if energy prices will fall. 
Nevertheless, Russia did no succeed in diversifying its structure of export goods. This seems 
not to be worrisome as long as energy prices are high or almost steadily increasing. However, 
the unbalanced structure of Russian foreign trade can have negative effects in the long run. 
A wide gap exists between the current (positive) development and the long-run projections of 
the Russian energy sector. The targets of the energy strategy for crude oil and natural gas 
production can only be achieved if investment in both sectors increases. Thus, the improve-
ment of the investment climate remains the main task of Russian energy policy. 
Regarding the climate policy of Russia, because of strong economic growth and the interest to 
further export fossil energy, future climate policy activities most likely will be very low on 
the political agenda. As many scientists in Russia believe that there is no man made climate 
threat and if there should be any climate change it could be beneficial for Russia, climate 
policy action will be slow or negligible. The main concern of Russia is that climate policy 
could limit economic growth and could reduce gains from trade of fossil fuel. 
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